党的十八大以来，党的领导地位进一步凸显。大量党政体系的“中心工作”，使得我国地方党委政府的“条块”关系由以往的“条块结合”向着“条块合一”的趋势转变，地方党委在行政管理当中的作用越发突出。与西方国家不同，中国共产党不仅是实体化运行的政党，更是一个长期执政的领导核心，其执政理念和领导方式都对我国产生着深远影响。在“有为政府”的执政理念和对社会实现“有效治理”的双重动力驱动下，党必然产生出掌握国家行政权力的需求，因此，党委通过党管干部选拔任用和大政方针制定两个行政的重要核心内容，牢牢把握着行政的方向和基调。
本文正是在这样的背景下，试图通过对现实情况的观察总结，揭示地方党政体系内部的结构与运行情况，特别是地方党委政府间纵向协同的过程和运行机制。本文以B市为例，考察了党政体系纵向协同的“分管领导”模式和“领导小组”模式。“分管领导”模式下，党委通过市委常委会委员的归口领导、市政府党组的上传下达、分管副市长的分工负责，与各市政府部门建立了一个逐级“委托—代理”科层制的协同链条；之后，文章又通过对B市议事协调机构——市委生态文明委的结构及运行分析，阐释了“领导小组”协调的具体结构和方式。
研究发现，两种协调模式是B市党委政府为了应对不同工作选择的不同路径，两者互为补充，但其本质都是高度依赖领导权威的“等级式”协调方式。通过对比、梳理，发现背后折射出的是诸如部门保护主义、鼓励协同的激励不足、协同文化基础缺失等纵向协同困境的共性问题。说明，我国地方党委政府纵向协同的体系构建尚不完善，需要继续推进行政体制和协调机制改革加以解决。
因此，文章在后半部分整理了国外整体政府建设的实践策略及改革思路，并结合我国实际，提出基于整体政府视角的解决方案。指出，要突破“机构改革”的思维局限，转向跨部门协同的“运行机制改革”；规范议事协调机构设置及运用，解决治理目标的矛盾与冲突；合理设置官员激励，引导官员及部门自发谋求协调合作；推动行政管理体制改革，突破“职责同构”格局限制；规范政府内部信息共享行为，提升信息共享水平；鼓励多方参与，形成整体性治理的格局；全面推进依法治国，防范“议行合一”问题死灰复燃。要实现上述目标并非易事，有赖于在党的统筹领导下，持续推动行政体制改革走深走实，文章最后进行了总结并提出对我国整体政府改革的未来展望。

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the leadership position of the Party has further highlighted. With a series of "Central tasks" have been promoted, making the "Tiao-kuai " relationship of local Party committees and governments change from the previous "Tiao-kuai combination" to "Tiao-kuai integration ". The role of local party committees in administrative management is becoming increasingly prominent. Different from western countries, the Communist Party of China is not only a political party that operates in a substantive manner, but also a leadership core that has been in power for a long time. Its ruling philosophy and methods have had a profound impact on our country. Driven by the dual driving force of "promising government" and "effective governance", the party will inevitably have the need to control the state's administrative power. important core content of administration.
Against this background, this article attempts to reveal the internal structure and operation of the local party-government system, especially the process and operating mechanism of vertical coordination between local party committees and governments, through observation and summary of the actual situation. This article takes B city as an example to examine the "decentralized leadership" and "leadership group" models of vertical coordination between the party and government. Under the "decentralized leadership" model, the Party Committee has established a hierarchical collaborative chain of "commission agency" with various municipal government departments through the centralized leadership of members of the Municipal Committee Standing Committee, the upload and release of the Municipal Government Party Group, and the division of responsibilities of deputy mayors in charge; Afterwards, the article further analyzed the structure and operation of B City's deliberative and coordinating body - the Ecological Civilization Committee of the Municipal Party Committee, and explained the specific structure and method of coordination of the "leadership group".
Our research has found that the two coordination modes are different paths chosen by the Party Committee and Government of B City to respond to different work. The two complement each other, but their essence is a highly dependent "hierarchical" coordination method on leadership authority. Through comparison and sorting, it was found that the common issues reflected behind it are the difficulties of vertical collaboration, such as departmental protectionism, insufficient incentives to encourage collaboration, and a lack of cultural foundation for collaboration. It indicates that the construction of the vertical coordination system between local party committees and governments in China is not yet perfect, and it is necessary to continue to promote the reform of the administrative system and coordination mechanism to solve it.
Therefore, in the latter half of the article, the practical strategies and reform ideas of foreign whole-of-government construction are sorted out, and combined with the reality of our country, a solution based on the perspective of whole-of-government is proposed. It is pointed out that it is necessary to break through the thinking limitations of "institutional reform" and turn to the "operational mechanism reform" of cross-departmental coordination; Standardize the setting and application of the deliberative and coordinating bodies, and resolve the contradictions and conflicts of governance objectives; Reasonably set official incentives and guide officials and departments to seek coordination and cooperation spontaneously; Promote the reform of the administrative management system and break through the restriction of "responsibility isomorphism" pattern; Standardize the information sharing behavior within the government and improve the level of information sharing; Encourage the participation of multiple parties to form a pattern of overall governance; Comprehensively promote the law-based governance and prevent the issue of "combination of legislative and executive powers". It is not easy to achieve the above goals. It depends on the continuous promotion of the reform of the administrative system under the overall leadership of the CCP. At the last part of the article ,I summarizes the development of the holistic government construction in China and its future expectancy.