想象力和知性的自由游戏是康德在第三批判中为解决鉴赏判断的普遍有效性难题、因而亦是解决美的普遍有效性难题所提出的重要观点。它所关涉的是想象力和知性这两种认识能力之间的一种协作关系，这一关系康德认为是认识中也要求着的。因而，在何种程度上两者相互关联，又在何种程度上两者相互独立是康德在对鉴赏判断的分析中始终关注的问题。本文试图通过对自由游戏理论的研究与探讨，论证想象力与知性自由游戏这一理论作为解决鉴赏判断不涉及概念却依然能够要求普遍赞同这一命题成立的可能性。 按照Guyer和Kueplen的划分，“自由游戏”理论目前存在五种解释模式：前认识解释模式、多元认识解释模式、后认识解释模式、象征解释模式以及抽象解释模式，诸解释模式都在不同层面上回应了这一理论所面临的难题。笔者支持前认识解释模式，认为鉴赏判断不涉及任何经验性概念——不论是后认识解释模式所说的确定的经验性概念，还是多元认识解释模式所说的不确定的经验性概念，因而它所要求的普遍赞同也不是由概念来保证的，而是另有来源：1）范畴/纯粹知性概念。自由游戏作为一种反思性的意识活动，必然受到纯粹知性概念的规定，这种规定来自于范畴对意识表象统一性的规定，即把所有的意识都归为主体自身“我”的意识；2）反思性判断的自然合目的性原则。它不是由外部颁布的，也并不是在活动之前预设的，而只是在活动的过程中找到的；3）知性朝向一般认识的要求，引导想象力的活动；4）想象力无概念的图型化，图型是对感性杂多的抽象处理，可以作为一种规则而拥有普遍有效性。另外，知性“朝向一般认识”与想象力“无概念的图型化”活动体现了这两种心灵能力从认识到鉴赏地位的反转，这就将认识判断和鉴赏判断所要求的两种协调一致区别开来，从而避免了一切皆美的问题。

The free play of imagination and understanding is Kant’s important theory in solving the universal validity of judgment of taste in Third Critique, and also in solving the universal validity of beauty. It is related to a cooperative relationship between imagination and understanding, which is also required in cognition. Therefore, to what extent the two are related to each other and to what extent they are independent of each other is Kant’s concern in the analysis of judgment of taste. This paper attempts to analyze the contradiction and tension in free play, and demonstrate the possibility of establishment of it, namely, the free play of imagination and understanding as a solution to the judgment of taste does not involve concept but still can demand the universal validity. According to the division of Guyer and Kueplen, there are five Interpretations in “free play” theory at present: Precognitive Interpretation, Multicognitive Interpretation, Metacognitive Interpretation, Symbolic Interpretation, and Abstract Interpretation. The Interpretations respond to the challenges faced by this theory at different levels. I support Precognitive Interpretation, and believe that the judgment of taste does not involve any empirical concept - whether it is the definite empirical concept described in Metacognitive Interpretation or the uncertain empirical concept described in Multicognitive Interpretation. The general agreement required is not guaranteed by the concept, but by another source: 1) Category or pure concept of understanding. As a kind of reflective consciousness activity, free play is inevitably subject to the concept of pure concept of understanding. This kind of regulation comes from the stipulation of the category on the unity of consciousness, that is, the consciousness of all the consciousness as “I”; 2) The purposiveness principle of nature. It is not issued by the outside, nor is it pre-set before the event, but only found in the activity; 3) the requirement toward the general cognition demanded by understanding; 4) Schemtismus without concept of imagination. Schema is an abstract treatment of perceptual manifold, and can be universally valid as a rule. In addition, “toward general cognition” of understanding and Schemtismus without concept of imagination reflect the reversal of these two faculties from recognition to taste, which distinguishes the two kind of harmony required by cognitive judgment and taste judgment, thus avoiding the problem that everything is beautiful.