基于沪深A股上市公司数据资料，本文旨在考察控股股东股权质押对公司高管股权激励政策的可能影响。实证结果显示，控股股东股权质押比例与公司高管股权激励存在显著的正相关关系。进一步研究显示，在控股股东股权质押背景下公司实施的高管股权激励政策，带来企业盈余操纵水平的显著上升，和企业实质性（未经操纵）经营业绩的下降。从而表明，控股股东股权质押背景下公司实施的高管股权激励，在一定程度上体现为企业为维持公司股价稳定的内部人代理成本效应，而非基于与公司利益趋同提升业绩的激励效应。横截面分析显示，当控股股东股权质押面临较高的平仓风险以及当公司所处的内外部监管力度较低时，控股股东股权质押比例与高管股权激励强度的正相关关系更强。本文对控股股东股权质押经济后果的相关研究进行了探讨和拓展，以期能对监管机构和投资者的决策起到参考作用。

This paper examines the possible impact of pledging shares by the controlling shareholder on the executive equity incentive policies. The results show that pledging shares by the controlling shareholders is a significant positive relationship with the intensity of executive equity incentives. Further research shows that executive equity incentives implemented in the context of controlling shareholder equity pledges bring about a significant increase in the level of corporate earnings management and a decrease in the substantive (unmanipulated) operating performance of the firm. This suggests that executive equity incentives implemented in the context of controlling shareholder's equity pledge are, to some extent, an insider agency cost effect to maintain the stability of the firm's share price, rather than an incentive effect to improve performance based on convergence of interests. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the positive relationship between equity pledges and equity incentives is stronger in the high margin call pressure, low internal and external regulation group. The study of this paper deepens the research on the economic impact of equity pledge by controlling shareholders, which is enlightening for regulators and investors' decision making.