- 无标题文档
查看论文信息

中文题名:

 地方政府融资平台的风险分配研究    

姓名:

 高艳    

学科代码:

 1204Z1    

学科专业:

 政府经济管理    

学生类型:

 博士    

学位:

 管理学博士    

学位年度:

 2013    

校区:

 北京校区培养    

学院:

 管理学院    

研究方向:

 政府投融资管理    

第一导师姓名:

 魏成龙    

第一导师单位:

 北京师范大学管理学院    

提交日期:

 2013-06-23    

答辩日期:

 2013-06-08    

外文题名:

 The risk distribution of local government financing platform    

中文摘要:
地方政府融资平台自2008年后成为地方政府投融资的制胜法宝,但债务迅速膨胀引发的风险问题也成为我国政府和银行不得不面对的重大课题。在目前政府换届和“稳增长”的双重背景下,地方政府融资平台风险呈现累积和叠加态势。在风险膨胀压力剧增的境况下,我国地方政府融资平台风险正处于治理的关键时期,风险会成为政府投融资改革的一次机遇,还是会恶化为地方政府债务危机和金融危机,关键在于风险的分配和责任的履行。谁从平台投融资中获益,谁参与了制造风险,又是谁在平台风险的承担和治理中推卸责任、转移风险,风险是否在受益者和制造者之间均衡分配,这是地方政府融资平台的风险治理首先要明确的,它既关系到风险分配正义问题,也关系风险治理的效果,否则平台风险治理又将陷入“治理悖论”,成为下一场风险的起点。 在风险频繁发生的现代社会,风险分配与财富利益分配一样,日益成为社会关注的焦点。风险社会理论作为风险问题研究的新范式,认为现代社会已进入风险社会,风险分配超越了财富分配,成为社会的核心问题。风险分配与财富分配不同,财富分配向上集中,风险分配往下集中;财富分配存在差异性,风险分配既有差异性又有平等性。基于风险分配的理论,沿着平台风险分配的主线,本文在总体构思上由六章构成:第一章陈述本文的选题背景与意义,界定基本概念,在综述国内外研究现状的基础上,明确本文的研究方法、内容框架以及创新和不足。第二章首先介绍了风险社会理论的前世今生,根据风险社会理论有关风险的内涵从现实主义和建构主义两种视角对地方政府融资平台风险进行了全面界定,并通过梳理风险分配的理论脉络,进行平台风险分配的主体、分配权和方向等机制设计。第三章从平台投融资的运作过程厘清平台的利益相关者及其在平台运作中的获益情况,发现这些利益主体的逐利行为与风险的产生构成因果关系,至此我们确定平台的获益者和风险的制造者。然后通过追寻平台风险分配和转移的轨迹,得出平台风险分配失衡的结论:主体所承担的风险与他们的获益和责任并不均衡。第四章分析了平台风险分配失衡的原因:风险地位不平等将主体分化为强势主体和弱势主体;平台风险的不确定性使责任主体迷失,无法评责问责;主体趋利避害的风险本能推动主体见利忘险、见险不担;最后风险转移约束机制的低效为主体逃避风险不担责任提供了通道。第五章探讨了平台风险分配失衡的再生产效应,不仅影响主体风险心态和治险能力,而且在展期和换届的政治周期下影响风险治理效果,导致风险累加。即便是目前被奉为治理良药的地方政府发债在风险分配失衡的环境下也可能引发风险再生,得不偿失。因此,第六章以风险分配正义为价值取向,提升主体的风险共担责任和能力,构建主体共担风险的激励和约束机制,并进行顶层设计以消除风险内生根源,建立风险转移和蔓延的隔离墙,推动主体主动负起风险治理的责任。 地方政府融资平台风险的分配失衡不仅影响主体担险治险的积极性,而且导致风险累加和再生产,甚至会增加风险转化为系统性危机的几率。因此本文在风险社会理论有关风险分配论述的指导下,构建平台风险分配的分析框架,探讨风险分配的失衡格局及其形成原因和治理之策。本文主要在以下三方面有一定的创新:一是不同于现有研究主要从现实主义角度出发,试图通过数据客观评价风险程度,本文从现实主义和建构主义两方面全面地界定地方政府融资平台风险,其中对不同主体的风险认知变化及其原因的分析有助于理解主体在风险分配中的表现;二是通过分析平台风险的转移路线,发现风险分配的最终结果是向下集中,印证了风险社会理论关于“风险分配向下集中”的观点。但集中的过程不同,平台风险在分配时呈现“先向上集中,然后出现分散式的向下集中”的规律。三是通过比较平台各主体的获益、风险责任和承受的风险损害,分析得出平台风险在主体间的分配与主体的获益、责任不匹配,强势主体获益多、责任大却担险少,弱势主体获益少、责任小却担险多。
外文摘要:
Since 2008, Local government financing platform has become the holy grail of local government investment and financing, but the risks arising from the rapid expansion of debt has also become a major issue which our government and banks had to face. At the dual context of changing of government and the "steady growth", the risk of local government financing platform presents an accumulation and superimposed situation. The situation of the risk of expansion pressure surges, the risks of local government financing platform in China is in a critical period of governance, whether the risk will be an opportunity for government investment and financing reform or it will deteriorate into local government debt crisis lies in the allocation of risk and responsibility division and performance. Who benefits from the platform investment and financing, who participates in the manufacturing risk, who shirks their responsibilities or transfers risk on the government financing platform, whether the risk benefits subject and manufactures a balanced distribution between the main——all of these are the local government financing platform risk governance must first clear.It is not only related to the risk of distributive justice issues, but also related to the effect of the relationship between risk management and the platform risk governance,or it will turn into a “governance paradox”, under a risk starting point. In modern society, the risk occurrs frequently. Risk allocation and wealth distribution of benefits, are increasingly becoming the focus of attention. The new paradigm of risk society theory is as a matter of risk, and even that the risk society, risk allocation has gone beyond the distribution of wealth, becoming the core of society. Risk allocation and distribution of wealth are different, the distribution of wealth concentrated upward, concentration of risk allocation is downward; there are differences in the distribution of wealth, the allocation of risk has both differences and equality. Based on the theory of risk allocation and the main line along the platform risk allocation, the overall concept of this paper composes of six chapters: Chapter I describes the background and significance of this paper, define the basic concepts in the summary of progress which is on the basis of clear research method, the framework, as well as innovative and shortcomings. Chapter II firstly introduces the past and presence of the risk society theory, in accordance with the connotation of the risk society theory from two perspectives of realism and constructivism risks of local government financing platform fully defined, basing on the theoretical context of risk allocation, build platforms, the main risk allocation, distribution rights and the direction of mechanism design. Chapter III processes to clarify the operation of the investment and financing from the platform to the interests of the platform and its benefit in the operation of the platform, and found that the generation of profit-driven behavior of these stakeholders and risk a causal relationship, bringing us to determine the benefit of the platform and the risk of the manufacturer. Then pursue the trajectory of the platform risk allocation and transfer to come to the platform for the risk imbalance in the distribution of the conclusions: the main risk with their benefits and responsibilities are uneven. The fourth chapter analyzes the platform for the risk imbalance in the distribution of the reasons: the risk of the subject while avoiding disadvantages risk of unequal status between the main differentiation as a strong body and vulnerable body; the platform risk uncertainty over the main responsibility for lost, accountability assessment can not be responsible for; instinction to promote the main profit-forget insurance, to see insurance does not bear; final transfer of risk to the lack of restraint mechanism as the main risk aversion which does not assume responsibility for the channel. The fifth part discusses the risk imbalance in the distribution of reproduction effect, not only affect the state of mind of the principal risks and governance risk capabilities, but also affect the risk management in the context of extension and general effect, leading to accumulation of risks and regeneration. Therefore, Chapter VI is about risks of distributive justice as the value orientation to enhance the subject's own risk responsibilities and capabilities to build the main own risk incentive and restraint mechanisms, to change the rules to eliminate the root that causes endogenous risk. The establishment of risk transfers and the spreadth of the wall takes it upon themselves to promote the main risk management responsibilities. The risk of imbalance in the distribution of local government financing platform not only affects the enthusiasm of the risk,but also the risk of accumulation and reproduction, and even increase the probability of risk into a systemic crisis. On the allocation of risks, this article discusses under the guidance of the theory of risk society, and build a platform for the allocation of risk analysis framework to explore the risk imbalance in the distribution pattern and the formation of the reasons and governance policies. In this paper, the innovation is in the following three areas: First, different from the existing research from the perspective of realism which attempts to data objective evaluation of the degree of risk, this paper will demonstate from realism and constructivism comprehensive definition of the risk of local government financing platform, which analysises the main changes in risk perception and its causes to help to understand the performance of the main body of the risk allocation; analysising of the platform risk transfer line, the final result of the allocation of risk is concentrated down, confirming the theory of risk society that the “risk allocation concentrated down”. Centralized platform risk allocation shows the law of “upwardly and concentrated, and then distributed down to focus on”. Third, the main benefit of comparing the platform risk responsibility and bear the risk of damage turns out to be analysis of the platform risk allocation between the main body and the main benefits.The responsibility does not match the strong main benefit ,but will take risks less disadvantaged, the main benefit liability is small, but take risks.
参考文献总数:

 6    

馆藏地:

 图书馆学位论文阅览区(主馆南区三层BC区)    

馆藏号:

 博120420/1303    

开放日期:

 2013-06-23    

无标题文档

   建议浏览器: 谷歌 360请用极速模式,双核浏览器请用极速模式