国有企业是国民经济的支柱，有效激励国企经营者发挥其主动性、能动性和创新性，是实现国有企业和国民经济持续健康发展的关键。长期以来，国企经营者激励存在两个难题：因国企经营者双重身份而带来的双重激励问题；以及因任务目标多元导致国企经营者考核和激励的复杂性问题。虽然以往的研究提出了国企经营者激励制度的改革方法和途径，但是忽视了国企经营者双重身份和国企多任务目标其实是同一个问题的两个方面，经营者身份是激励设计的基础，国企任务目标多元是激励设计的特征。

本研究借鉴委托代理理论和组织行为学等激励理论，创新性提出国企经营者为公职人员身份经营者，并构建国企公职人员经营者激励理论框架，将国企多任务特征加入国企公职人员经营者激励问题中讨论，以期实现有效激励国企经营者的最终目标。首先，通过建立筛选模型，推导出经营者最优来源方式，确定经营者身份，并以此构建国企公职人员身份经营者激励理论框架；其次，通过运用Holmstrom和Milgrom的多任务委托代理模型，构建国有企业多任务委托代理模型，并运用仿真模拟进行实证检验，解决国企多任务相关下经营者薪酬激励设计问题；再次，通过构建计量模型，使用面板数据检验国企经营者晋升对经济任务、社会责任任务以及政治任务指标绩效的影响。比较分类前和分类后，不同类型国企经营者晋升激励效果的差异，为分类改革下国企经营者的晋升激励效果提供实证检验；最后，建立激励——监督均衡模型，讨论完全信息下、不完全信息条件下经营者的监督激励，探讨监督对激励的替代和保障作用。研究得出以下结论:

第一，国企经营者应为公职人员身份经营者。本研究通过建立市场结构筛选模型和政府层级结构筛选模型，确定在尚未建立充分竞争的职业经营者市场之前，政府层级结构为最严格的筛选方式，可以选出最优质的国企经营者，但具有成本较高的缺点。市场结构更适合选拔出数量较多的优质经营者，前提是建立竞争的职业经营者市场。

第二，国企多任务之间并非独立而是具有相关性，并会影响经营者的绩效薪酬。国企多任务的相关性可被进一步细分为互补型和替代型。互补型任务的总成本函数小于单独完成两项任务成本之和，替代型任务的总成本函数大于完成两项单独任务的成本之和。在此基础上，本文阐述激励的有效性，取决于任务的可观测性，可观测性越高，激励效果越明显。任务的可观测性不仅与自身有关，还与相关任务的可观测性有关，会影响经营者对不同任务的努力程度。

第三，国企经营者的晋升激励会带来多任务指标绩效的上升。此外，以“商业类”作为虚拟变量，发现晋升对商业类国有企业经营者的激励效果更明显。而对公益类和特定功能保障类国企经营者的社会责任任务激励不足。该研究结论对分类下不同类型国企经营者的激励方式选择，提供了实证支撑。

本文的研究贡献主要体现在以下几个方面：研究思路的转变，将国企经营者身份和国企多任务特征放在同一框架中讨论，建立国企公职人员经营者激励理论框架。以更广阔的研究视角，将多任务委托代理理论模型运用到国企多任务特征中，构建了更具普适性的国企多任务委托代理模型。以国企分类改革为背景，实证检验分类下国企经营者的晋升激励对多任务指标绩效的影响，就国企经营者的激励问题做出了新的探索。

State-owned enterprises are the backbone of the national economy. Effectively stimulate the state-owned enterprises operators and give them full play to initiative and innovation is the key to realize the sustainable and healthy development of state-owned enterprises and national economy. For a long time, there are two difficult incentive problems for SOE operators: the SOE operators have dual identity and dual incentive; the diversification of tasks and objectives in state-owned enterprises makes it difficult to assess and motivate operators. Though past research has put forward the direction and method for state-owned enterprise operators’ incentive system reform, it ignored an important premise: operator double identity and multi-task actually is the same question, identity is the basis of the incentive, and an operator multitask property is the features of state-owned enterprises incentive design.

This study by using principal-agent theory and organizational behavior theory, claimed that the state-owned enterprisers operators are civil servant operators. In addition, build state civil servant incentive theory frame, put multitask features to join the state-owned enterprises civil servant operators’ incentive problems, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of incentive state-owned enterprises civil servant operators effectivly. Firstly, constructed the theoretical framework of SOE civil servant operators’ incentive framework. Secondly, the multi-task principal-agent model of state-owned enterprises were constructed by using the multi-task principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom, and the simulation was used for empirical test to solve the design problem of compensation incentive for operators in multi-task related state-owned enterprises. Thirdly, by constructing an econometric model and using panel data for statistical analysis research methods, the influence of the promotion of state-owned enterprise operators on the economic task, social responsibility task and political task performance were test. By comparing the differences between the promotion incentive effect of different types of SOE operators before and after classification, it provides an empirical test for the incentive effect of SOE operators after classification reform. Finally, by establishing the incentive-supervision equilibrium model, the paper discusses the operators’ supervision incentive under the condition of complete information and incomplete information, and discusses the substitution and safeguard effect of supervision incentive. The basic conclusions are as follows:

Firstly, the identification model of state-owned enterprise operators shows that state-owned enterprise operators are civil servant status. Before the establishment of competitive operator market, compared with the market screening structure, the government hierarchy screening is the strictest method, which can select the best state-owned enterprise operators with high cost.

Secondly, the state-owned enterprises multi-tasks are not only independent but also correlated and will affect the of operators’ performance salary. The reletivity of SOE multi- tasks could be divided into complementary and alternative; The complementary task total cost function is less than the sum of two independent task costs, the total cost function of substitute task is greater than the sum of the two independent task costs; The effectiveness of excitation is mainly determined by the task observability. The higher the observability, the stronger the incentive effect; The observability of relevant tasks is not only related to itself, but also related to the observability of related tasks, which will affect the operators’ efforts choice for different tasks.

Thirdly, the promotion incentive of state-owned enterprise operators will improve the performance of multi-task index. Multi-task performance includes economic task index, social responsibility task and political task index performance. In addition, taking “business” as a dummy variable, found that promotion has a more obvious incentive effect on state-owned commercial enterprises operators. However, the motivation for social responsibility task of state-owned enterprise operators of public welfare is not enough. The findings provide empirical support for the selection of incentive modes for operators of different types of state-owned enterprises after classification.

The innovation of this study lies in: The change of research thinking, put the state-owned enterprise operators’ identity and multi-task characteristics in the same framework, and establish the incentives theoretical framework for state-owned enterprise civil servant operators; The expansion of the research perspective, applying the multi-task principal-agent theory model to the state-owned enterprises multi-task characteristics, building a more general multi-task principal-agent model. It further complemented and completed the classified SEO incentive theory under the multi-task independent condition; The research methods are rich, it provided empirical test for the classified state-owned enterprise civil servants operators’ incentive theory.