当我们在讨论身体意识是一种什么样的意识时，其中的核心问题之一是“身体意识（特指自体感觉意识）是否是一种知觉”，对这个问题的回答将具体涉及以下几个问题：“自体感觉意识是否是一种对象知觉”、“自体感觉意识在具身性自我的空间框架形成中扮演了怎样的角色”、“自体感觉意识与其他一般知觉模型之间的关系”、“如何理解知觉的基本要素及其本质”等等。本文的立场是自体感觉意识是一种知觉，并且将尝试论证它是一种特殊的自我知觉。

具体来说，我们从对西德尼·肖梅克（Sidney Shoemaker）的“对象知觉模型”的研究开始，首先初步讨论自体感觉意识是否符合对象知觉的“对象限定”、“识别限定”、“多重对象限定”、“内在的非关系属性”等基本特征，并在此基础上证明自体感觉意识严格来说并不符合标准的“对象知觉模型”。但鉴于本文并不仅仅是简单停留在对“是否符合”这个问题的回答上，而是尝试在对“对象知觉模型”的基本特征做出新的解释和一定的让步后，得出自体感觉意识是可以符合这些限定特征的，同时，这也在某种程度上说明，自体感觉意识与更普遍意义上或者说更深层次的知觉的本质并不是相悖的。

接着，本文考量了反对自体感觉意识知觉论的一个典型立场：知觉往往具有视角性，而这种视角性是基于以自我为中心的具身性框架产生的；且自体感觉构成了该具身性框架；因此，如果自体感觉意识是一种知觉，那它也需要基于该具身性框架产生视角性，而同时该框架又是由它构成，这将导致无限倒退。由此出发，本文认为形成具身性框架的自体感觉及自体信息相较于自体感觉意识是更宽泛的概念，它们不仅涉及来自身体内部的信息，而且还涉及来自身体外部的信息；在此概念澄清的基础上进一步讨论该反对的前提是否成立，对该前提的讨论又细分为“自体感觉意识是否具有视角性”和“视角性是否是知觉的必要条件”这两个子问题，本文对于这两个问题的回答都是否定的。基于前文对自体感觉意识与一般知觉的具身性自我的框架的讨论，最后将进一步研究自体感觉意识与其他知觉模型的交互关系，并论证当自体感觉意识是一种知觉时，我们能更好地解释这种交互关系。

在上述论证基础上，本文最后对“自体感觉意识是一种特殊的知觉”这个立场展开辩护。罗伯特·奥迪（Robert Audi）指出知觉有四种基本元素：知觉者、被知觉的对象、对象呈现给知觉者的感觉经验、对象和知觉者的因果关系（也即对象产生这个经验的关系）。根据此理论基础以及前文章节中对相关问题的初步阐释和分析，本文分别从以下维度对自体感觉意识知觉论立场中存在争议的问题展开梳理和回应：首先，在隐性形式的自体感觉意识下，意识主体的注意力并没有集中在身体上，这是否会削弱自体感觉意识知觉论；其次，自体感觉意识的“对象”（即身体）是否能作为知觉的可能对象；最后，尝试推进对“自体感觉意识是对身体的自我知觉”的总结论证、并回应可能的反驳。

When we discuss what kind of awareness body awareness is, one of the central questions is "Whether body awareness (specifically proprioceptive consciousness) is a kind of perception", and the answer to this question will specifically involve the following questions: "Is proprioceptive consciousness an object perception", "What role does proprioceptive consciousness play in the formation of the spatial framework of the embodied self", "How does proprioceptive consciousness relate to other general models of perception", "How do we understand the basic elements of perception and its nature" and so on. The position of this paper is that proprioceptive consciousness is a kind of perception, and it will try to argue that it is a special kind of self-perception.

Specifically, we begin with a study of Sidney Shoemaker's "model of object perception" by initially discussing whether proprioceptive consciousness meets the core features of object perception, "object constraint", "identification constraint", "multiple object constraint", "intrinsic non-relational properties", and on the basis of which it is demonstrated that proprioceptive consciousness does not strictly conform to the standardized "object perception model". However, this paper does not simply stop at answering the question of "whether or not it conforms", but tries to conclude that proprioceptive consciousness can conform to these restricted features after making new explanations and certain concessions to the basic features of the "object perception model". At the same time, it also shows to some extent that proprioceptive consciousness is not incompatible with the nature of perception in a more general sense or at a deeper level.

The paper then considers a typical position against the perceptualism position of proprioceptive consciousness: perception tend to be perspectival, and that this perspectivity is produced on the basis of an egocentric embodied frame; and that proprioceptive consciousness constitutes that embodied frame; therefore, if proprioceptive consciousness is a perception, it also needs to be perspectival on the basis of the embodied frame, which at the same time constitutes it, which would lead to infinite regress. Starting from this, the paper argues that proprioception and proprioceptive information, which form the framework of embodiment, are broader concepts than proprioceptive consciousness, and that they involve not only information from inside the body, but also information from outside the body; based on this conceptual clarification, it further discusses the validity of the premise of the objection, which is further subdivided into the question of "whether proprioceptive consciousness has perspectivity" and "whether perspectivity is a necessary condition for perception", both of which are answered in the negative in this paper. Based on the previous discussion of the framework of proprioceptive awareness and the embodied self of general perception, we will conclude by further investigating the interactions between proprioceptive awareness and other models of perception, and by arguing that we can better account for such interactions when proprioceptive awareness is a kind of perception.

On the basis of the above arguments, the paper concludes with a defense of the position that "proprioceptive consciousness is a special kind of perception". According to Robert Audi, there are four basic elements of perception: the perceiver, the object to be perceived, the sensory experience that the object presents to the perceiver, and the causal relation between the object and the perceiver (i.e., the relation in which the object produces the experience). Based on this theoretical foundation as well as the preliminary elucidation and analysis of the relevant issues in the previous article section, this paper composes and responds to the controversial issues in the perceptualism position of proprioceptive consciousness from the following dimensions respectively: Firstly, under the attentionally recessive form of proprioceptive consciousness, the attention of the conscious subject does not focus on the body, and whether this weakens the perceptualism position of proprioceptive consciousness; Secondly, the proprioceptive conscious "object" (i.e., the body) as a possible object of perception; Finally, an attempt to advance the concluding argument that "proprioceptive consciousness is self-perception of the body" and to respond to possible objections.