“三去一降一补”始于2015年，这一政策框架包括去产能、去库存、去杠杆、降成本和补短板五个方面，旨在优化供给结构，提高经济增长质量。其中，棚户区改造货币化安置是“去库存”的重要抓手，而地方政府则是政策实施过程中的主要推手和责任人。本文选取2013-2020年间47个不同层级的城市，通过构建强度指标来衡量棚户区货币安置政策的影响程度，并采用连续型双重差分模型来分析棚户区货币化安置政策对于地方政府债务的影响以及不同层级城市受影响程度的异质性。主要结论为：第一，棚改货币化安置政策在实施当期对地方政府债务没有显著影响，对滞后期的地方政府债务有显著正向影响，存在滞后效应；第二，对不同层级的城市影响的程度不同，三四线城市较一二线城市受到更显著的影响；三四线省会城市相对于非省会城市受到更显著的影响。我们推测这可能是由于经济发达地区有健全的房地产市场和雄厚的产业支撑，货币化安置政策产生的外部冲击较小，且地方政府偿债能力更强；三四线省会城市的货币化安置政策未能起到预期的市场推动作用，造成债务杠杆转移机制不畅。

The 'Three Deductions, One Reduction, and One Supplement' policy, initiated in 2015, encompasses five aspects: reducing overcapacity, reducing inventory, deleveraging, reducing costs, and filling shortfalls, all aimed at optimizing the supply structure and enhancing the quality of economic growth. Among these, the monetized resettlement policy for shantytown transformation represents a vital strategy for reducing inventory, with local governments being the main drivers and responsible parties in the policy implementation process. This paper analyzes 47 cities of various tiers from 2013 to 2020, utilizing an intensity index to measure the impact of the shantytown monetized resettlement policy, and employs a continuous double difference model to study its effect on local government debt as well as the heterogeneity of impact across cities of different tiers. The main findings are: First, monetized resettlement for shantytown renovation had no significant effect on local government debt in the period of implementation but had a significant positive effect on the lagged periods, indicating a lag effect; second, the impact varies by city tier, with third and fourth-tier cities being more significantly affected than first and second-tier cities; and third, provincial capital cities in the third and fourth tiers are more significantly affected compared to non-provincial capital cities. This discrepancy might be due to economically developed areas having robust real estate markets and strong industrial support, which minimizes the external shocks of the monetization policy and enhances local governments' ability to manage debt; in contrast, the expected market-driving effects of the monetization policy were not achieved in third and fourth-tier provincial capital cities, leading to inefficient debt lever transfer mechanisms.