本研究运用马斯洛需求理论、特殊构面的满意度理论、激励相容理论和公共政策工具理论，采用质性研究方法，从规范文本、理论文献和深度访谈入手，了解了我国法律援助办案补贴制度与律师提供法律援助服务需要之间的激励相容情况。访谈对象分布在北京、哈尔滨和深圳三个地域，包括法律援助的NGO律师、Pro Bono律师和商业律师，法官/仲裁员和政府法律援助机构的管理人员。以马斯洛需求层级模型为框架，经研究发现，商务模式下的法律援助律师以物质需要为核心，五种需要层级呈正金字塔形状。而Pro Bono和NGO模式下的法律援助律师，虽然生存仍然处于需要的第一位，但生存与经济收入的需要比重却并不是最多的，而自我实现、获得尊重与社会地位、归属感的需要则大于对经济收入的需要，需求层级呈倒金字塔形状。现行办案补贴制度下，法律援助律师感觉应得的回报与感觉实际得到的回报之间普遍存在差异。对于商务律师来说，因法律援助与其他律师业务经济回报存在悬殊的差距，使得商务律师感觉得到的量远低于感觉应得的量。因此，商务律师对法律援助办案补贴的满意度低。对于Pro Bono律师来说，一方面是因为法律援助业务不能保障律师获取足够的案源与基本收入，动摇了Pro Bono律师的生存底线；另一方面因兼有商业与公益律师的双重身份而受到双重排斥与挤压，使得Pro Bono律师感觉得到的量远低于感觉应得的量。而在NGO模式中，因NGO对专职法律援助律师采用了固定薪水制、辅以奖金与福利待遇而满足了律师的基本生存需要；创建了人才战略和团队支持系统，基本满足了律师的需要。但NGO薪水制绝对值偏低及与律师行业整体收入水平相对差距较大，也导致了律师心理失衡，损害了律师从事法律援助业务的职业尊严。在以办案补贴为核心的法律援助委托代理关系中，存在着受援当事人、政府、律师事务所和律师四方主体，当事人委托律师代理案件要经过政府和律师事务所两级中介，在法律援助委托代理关系中四方主体均有多重交叉的委托/代理身份，形成了“四元四级五对多重”的委托代理关系。这种“四元四级五对多重”的委托人与代理人之间的激励机制完全是由制度设定的，基本上排除了各方委托人与代理人之间通过自由协商、互动博弈而达成激励相容的机会。为达成制度激励的目标，政策工具的选择与机制就成为法律援助委托代理关系能否实现激励相容的关键。然而，经研究发现，办案补贴制度设计缺乏如下“激励相容”的基本要件。一是，办案补贴制度仅考虑到给予受援人社会福利的最大化和财政支出的最俭约化，却未将律师个人利益最大化作为设定的目标。二是，目标单一、偏倚，制度本身不具有激励相容的基本要件。三是，办案补贴制度规则结构威权过盛，民主不足。徒有“补贴”的名义，但不具有公共治理“补贴工具”的混合与引导属性，仍是政府威权家长制下的治理手段。办案补贴制度设计缺位导致经费来源单一，限制了法律援助的供给能力，一方面造成了法律援助实现程度上的失利，另一方面造成了资源浪费，影响了办案质量；同时，办案补贴制度未能满足律师个人需要，导致法律援助业务被寡占的格局，引发了管理操作中的矛盾冲突、影响了补贴支付方式对律师与客户关系的影响，并造成了法律援助人才严重流失。为此，本文提出以下建议：一是要改变认识，重新定位政府在法律援助支付制度中的角色，重新定位法律援助律师费用的角色；二是要改变法律援助律师禁止风险代理的规定，增加律师费转付制度，将第三方付费方式多元化；三是确立法律援助经费财政保障与配套制度，强化法律援助机构的监督管理。虽然办案补贴制度是中国法律援助制度的一个“细枝末节”，但从解剖这只小麻雀入手，可以触及到中国法律援助制度、律师制度、乃至福利制度的创设与运行的多个方面。办案补贴的研究领域还很宽广，从政府、律师事务所、受援当事人和律师制度不同角度，还有不少问题需要深入探讨。

This study tries to determine whether the requirements on legal aid lawyers and institutional subsidies are incentivizing those lawyers in a compatible way. The methods of this study include qualitative research, data analysis of regulations, thesis, and interviews with judges, officials of legal aid bureaus, and lawyers working in NGOs and private firms. The interviews were conducted in Beijing Harbin and Shenzhen. The study is based on several theories, including Maslow’s Demands Theory, Degree of Satisfaction on Special Construction, Incentive Compatibility Constraint and Tools of Public Policy. The study finds that lawyers have different demand structure under Maslow’s Demands Theory. In the Private Model, money is the core of the requirement to legal aid lawyers. The 5 kinds of demands (physiology, safe, love and belonging, respect and self-reality) construct in upright pyramid. On the contrary, in the Pro Bono and NGO models, though still based on the physiology, the importance of money is reduced. The 5 demands stand as a downright pyramid.The Subsidy system in operation, the private lawyers usually feels getting far less than he deserves, which results in low degree of satisfaction. To Pro Bono lawyer, the degree of satisfaction is also low too because with insufficient income and pressure from his identity as both private and public interest lawyer. Only in NGO model, lawyers can get regular salary, bonus and other welfares which satisfy the demand for living. Furthermore, NGO have more established training and team support systems. Lawyers in NGO feel satisfied except for the lower income. The gap between their incomes and their counterparts in private lawyering damages their professional dignity.With the theory of Incentive Compatibility Constraint, the relationship of legal aid for the case subsidies include 4 participants, the assisted client, government, law firm and lawyer. Each of the four has more than one role in the relationship. All of them compose of the complex relationship called four-angles, four-levels, five-partners and multi-roles. The complex relationship is not managed by themselves by ways of negotiations or compromises. On the contrary, all of rights and obligation are set by rules. In accordance with incentive compatibility and the mechanical design, it is regretful that the institutional structure of legal aid with subsidies lacks some of the basic factors. First, the Subsidies just look for the maximization on well-beings of clients and the lowest cost, but do not take into account the benefit of the lawyers. Second, the aim of the Subsidies is single and biased as makes the institution has no compatibility. Third, the subsidy tool is just a lie, because the whole institution structure is not based on democratic principle but rather on the authority of government.There are some consequences resulting from the shortcoming of the institutional structure of legal aid subsidies. For instance, the limited resources of funds restraint the ability to supply legal aids, waste resources and affect the quality of the legal services. It also damages the personal well-being of the legal aid lawyers. The legal aid cases are monopolized by a small number of people. It leads to conflicts in administration and affects the relationships between lawyers and clients. It also leads to the outflow of talent of legal aid.In order to deal with the above-mentioned issues, based on international experiences, the institutional structure of subsidies to legal aid should be reformed. It should begin with the rethinking of the roles of government and lawyer fees in legal aid. Moreover, it should allow contingent fee arrangement, add fee-shifting system and consolidate the supervision and administration of agent. The study is just the first step to observe and explore the Subsidies Institution to Legal Aid. The issue seems as a small part of the legal aid institute, but with the hole, we can observe the whole design level on public policy, especially on how to choose the rules in public policy. Without deep research and correct understanding, any good tools may become harmful. It is necessary to do more research on the issue.