战略轰炸理论萌芽于第一次世界大战，一战后在欧美军界受到热议。美国军方在总结英、德等国空战效果和经验的基础上，确认无差别轰炸并非有效手段，应当对战争工业、铁路线和野战部队进行“精准轰炸”。20世纪30年代，美国陆军航空兵战术学校的军官们继承并发展了精确轰炸理论，强调轰炸交通线、军工厂、能源和原材料储藏地，既可以有效打击敌人，又能避免道德谴责。这一理论通过高级军官形成了第二次世界大战时期美军战略轰炸的基本战略，与英国皇家空军制定的在夜间对敌国城市实施区域轰炸的战略有着很大的不同，着重于在白天对事关战争的重点目标实行精确轰炸。
1942年美国陆军航空队第八航空队建立，标志着美国对德国开始战略轰炸。受到军力不足、天气恶劣等原因，从1942年到1944年诺曼底登陆前，美军虽然进行了一些较大规模轰炸行动，但对德国的战争工业影响较小，自身遭受了严重损失。这些问题在诺曼底登陆后有所改善，轰炸逐渐取得效果，有效打击了德国战争生产。二战后期，受到尽快结束战争并减少战争牺牲的压力，美军偏离了精确轰炸，参与了英国皇家空军轰炸机部队主导的对德国城市的轰炸，造成了一定的平民伤亡。
美国社会各界一致支持通过对德战略轰炸打赢战争的主张，但表现方式不一。美国总统罗斯福虽然在政治上谴责大规模轰炸，倡导精确轰炸，但在实际上听任了大规模杀伤性轰炸。军方上层或支持或反对，但都力图通过战略轰炸达到赢得战争、将空军建设成独立军种的目标。前线指挥官和机组成员作为轰炸的执行者和行为人，因为良心发现，对战略轰炸持谨慎态度，反对杀伤平民，甚至产生了对轰炸任务的质疑和内心的谴责。民众和媒体却从正义战争角度，积极鼓吹轰炸，主张动用一切手段打败敌人。
美国对德战略轰炸一定程度上打击了德国的战争生产能力，但没有达到通过空战破坏德国人士气的预期目标；在基本遵守精确轰炸指导思想的前提下，美军的轰炸造成的平民伤亡与英军相比较小，但同样不能逃脱道德谴责。但与冷战期间两个德国和统一后德国对轰炸问题带有政治色彩的争论和历史书写相比，美国二战后对轰炸的争论和历史书写更加关注轰炸的技术问题，所受的道德和民族负担较轻。只是随着德国作家约尔格·弗里德里希《大火》一书出版，关于战略轰炸的合法性和平民伤亡问题逐渐成为学界和公众的关注焦点。

The strategic bombing theories originated in World War I and were hotly debated among the military circle in Europe and the United States after the Great War. Basing on the air war effectiveness and experience of the United Kingdom and Germany, American military was convinced that indiscriminate bombing was not an effective method, and that war industries, railroad lines, troops in the field should be accurately bombed. In the 1930s, the officers in the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) succeeded and developed accurate bombing doctrines, assuming that the accurate bombing on transportation facilities, plants, sources of energy and raw materials could not only crack enemies but also avoid the moral condemnation. Higher officers developed this doctrine into a fixed strategic bombing strategy of the American military during World War II, which focused on accurately bombing key targets about the war during daytime. This doctrine was different from that of “area bombing” on enemy cities at night by British Royal Air Forces (RAF). 

American strategic bombing towards Germany commenced with the founding of Eighth Air Force, United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) in 1942. From 1942 to Normandy landings in 1944, due to the lack of forces and the bad weather, USAAF carried out a series of bombing operations on a large scale, resulting in little impact on German war industries, with a terrible cost of U.S. forces themselves. These problems were gradually solved after D-Day, and bombing gradually bore fruit, significantly damaging German war production. When World War II came to the end, USAAF deviated accurate bombing under the pressure of winning the war as soon as possible and decreasing war sacrifices, and took part in bombing German cities mainly by RAF Bombing Command, leading to some civilian casualties. 

All classes in the United States unanimously supported the strategic bombing against enemies, although the means of expressing the support varied. On the one hand, the president Franklin Roosevelt condemned massive bombing in politics as well as advocated American accurate bombing, but on the other, he allowed mass destructive bombing near the end of the war. Some higher military officials agreed with mass bombing, others disagreed with it, but they were all in favor of achieving the goals of winning the war and constructing the air force into an independent force by strategic bombing. Field commanders and aircrews executed bombing, and they took a serious attitude towards strategic bombing out of conscience. They resisted killing or hurting enemies meaninglessly and even started challenging and condemning bombing missions in their minds. On the other hand, the public and the media actively trumpeted bombing and appealed the U.S. defeat enemies by using every method from the perspective of the “just war”. 

American bombing damaged German war production, but did not undermine the morale of German people or achieve anticipated goals of breaking the morale by air raids; under the condition of obeying accurate bombing doctrine essentially, the civilian casualties made by American forces’ bombing was less than that made by British forces’, though American forces could not escape from less moral condemnations. Compared to the debates and historical writings with political characteristics in two Germanys during the Cold War and in the united Germany, those in the United States concerned more on technical issues about bombing, bearing a lighter moral and national burden. However, with the publication of Der Brand by J?rg Friedrich, a German writer, the legitimacy and civilian casualties about strategic bombing have gradually become the focus in scholarship circles and the public.