本文阐明了ESG信息披露通过对企业融资和投资的管理进而改善企业短债长用水平的理论机制，并利用彭博数据库的ESG信息披露评分和上市公司数据进行了实证检验。研究发现，企业通过披露ESG相关信息可改善自身的短债长用问题；不仅如此，相比于为节约成本主动选择短债长用的企业，ESG信息披露更有助于改善受到融资约束而被迫进行短债长用的企业；异质性分析发现，ESG信息披露对非国有、低杠杆、小规模的企业和信贷紧缩期时对短债长用的影响更显著。上述结果有助于帮助“被动型”企业改善短债长用程度，也提示政府有关部门尽快完善ESG信息披露体系并提高信贷配给效率，拓宽企业融资渠道。

This paper expounds the theoretical mechanism of ESG information disclosure to decrease the level of short-term debt used for long-term investment through the management of enterprise financing and investment, and makes an empirical test by using the ESG information disclosure score from Bloomberg database and the data of listed companies. It is found that by disclosing ESG information, enterprises can decrease the level of short-term debt used for long-term investment. Moreover, compared with enterprises that actively choose this behavior to save costs, ESG information disclosure is more conducive to help enterprises that are forced to carry out this behavior due to financing constraints. Heterogeneity analysis shows that ESG information disclosure has a more significant impact on non-state-owned, low-leverage and small-scale enterprises, or during the credit crunch. The above results are helpful for "passive" enterprises to decrease the level of short-term debt used for long-term investment, and also suggest that the relevant government departments should improve the ESG information disclosure system as soon as possible, improve the efficiency of credit allocation, and broaden the financing channels of enterprises.