人类个体间现实的依存状态及相关人际情感对美德的界定与践行有何影响？如何基于此实现并维系共同体生活中的仁爱和正义？无论一种伦理学或道德心理学主张对此给出何种答案，都不应忽视同情这种情感机制在其中的根本作用。本报告旨在重新检视相关学术主题的理论基石和设问有效性，故主要以消极（negative）论证视角逐一澄清现代人的道德选择与道德生活中可能令同情失效或无力的结构性障碍：引言和第一章是对哲学理论基础的取舍，暂时否定了以麦金太尔为代表的当代理论家将同情自身视作美德的导向，以及相应的通过教育习得同情的主张，将同情概念的基础重新锚定为18世纪哲学家所确立的休谟式同感共鸣和卢梭式设身处地。由此出发的顺向论证是直接构建一种令同感共鸣和设身处地两类情感-心理机制协同生效的行动模式，借以解释和引导现代人的互动和关系，但这仍是下一步学术任务。

考虑到美德的道德心理探究之焦点始终应在可行性问题，故二至四章依次识别由同情达至善行、由善行达至好关系的动机障碍、道德直觉障碍和社会结构障碍，并论证避免或化解这些障碍是运用同情以支撑依存式美德的首要前提：动机障碍根源于休谟式内在动机力量总是锚定对象事态而非主体行动；化解的出路一方面在于休谟的情感论和道德学中表现为自我认可的历时性同情，另一方面在于儒家扩充恻隐之心以成仁爱之人的修身路径，或当代有效利他主义实践所提供的行善基准。道德直觉障碍根源于共同体成员对公共资源的一些简单分配公正直觉，以及陷入旁观者困境的公众对决策者责任和专业权威职责的消极义务式期待；基于依存与同情的化解出路一方面可参照典型思想实验中对每一种角色处境的设身处地，另一方面在于实际分配决策中的多元道德主体参与。社会结构障碍典型地体现为团体格局与差序格局的对比，后者导致了同情有差等，不仅使人际同情依据关系的近远而次第减弱，而且规制人们将同情的重心置于整个社会结构的主干权力中心；化解的出路不仅在于社会格局的平等转型和团体认同的真正建立，而且在于人与人之间形成更为丰富的共在感和互动理由。

How does the state of inter-dependence between human individuals and related interpersonal emotions affect our understanding and practice of virtue? How shall we realize and maintain benevolence and justice in community life based on these? Whatever answer an ethics or moral psychology may give to the questions above, the fundamental role of the emotional mechanism of sympathy can never be ignored. This report aims to re-examine the theoretical foundations and the relevance of common problématique in prevailing academic discussions. Therefore, it mainly takes a negative argumentation perspective to clarify, in turns, several structural obstacles in modern moral life that make sympathy ineffective or powerless: The introductory and the first chapters provide a choice among philosophical orientations. It temporarily denies the approach by contemporary ethical theorists represented by Alasdair MacIntyre to regard sympathy itself as a virtue, and the corresponding assertion that sympathy can be acquired through necessary education. On the contrary, I re-anchor the root of the concept of sympathy onto Humean and Rousseauian moral psychology and philosophy of passions back in 18th century. Following this and considering moral psychology of virtue should primarily focus on feasibility rather than desirability, Chapters 2 to 4 identify the motivational obstacles, moral intuitional obstacles, and social structural obstacles that prevent sympathy from good actions or good relationships.