自谷歌购物案以来，自我优待成为各国反垄断监管执法的关注重点。自我优待涵盖类型广泛、规制边界不清晰，现有反垄断法规制自我优待行为时也遇到了相关市场界定、市场支配地位认定困难的问题。

欧盟突破性地通过《数字市场法》（Digital Markets Act，简称“DMA”）中的守门人规则脱离了相关市场界定和市场支配地位认定这一环节，简化了复杂的经济分析过程。基于营业额、用户数量和市场地位标准确定的超级平台被认定为“守门人”，必须遵循禁止自我优待、保持数据互操作等一系列义务，否则将会面临罚款的惩罚措施。DMA赋予了欧盟委员会较大的规制自我优待的自由裁量权，让平台自我优待行为规制更加便捷高效，但是其事前规制的方式也引起了广泛的争议。主要体现在通过事前监管方式要求平台禁止自我优待的理论依据不充分，在混合式商业模式背景下要求平台保持中立性可能无法促进市场竞争，再者引入事前对自我优待行为的禁止性规定存在架空现有竞争法的风险。

针对以上问题，本文认为：首先，我国目前暂无必要直接引入守门人规则，对于不能通过搭售、拒绝交易和差别待遇规制的行为，可通过新《反垄断法》中的“数字条款”结合标准、指南在内的软法对自我优待行为进行规制，避免直接引入出现法律适用冲突的问题。因为自我优待本身存在一定的合理性，使用事前监管的方式进行规制存在着一刀切的风险，可能无法实现保护市场竞争的情况；欧盟也是通过执行法案和征求利益相关企业的意见来完善解决自我优待的举措，并非具备完全的结构性特点。其次，如果要对自我优待行为进行事前监管，那么应当对自我优待概念进行狭义解释。《数字市场法》中第6（5）中规定的一般自我优待行为因涉及搜索中立原则具备一定合理基础，但是数据使用相关的自我优待行为则需要保持谨慎；再者，处罚措施应当温和，避免强监管阻碍平台创新。从处罚措施来看，欧盟的守门人规则的优点在于谨慎使用结构性拆分功能，并且采取一事不再罚的原则。为平台提供合规指引时，应当为企业提供合理预期，必要时可引入利益相关者完善规则的制定，平台设置的规则应当具有透明度或者虽然不透明但是不限制平台内经营者的自由选择。

Since the Google search ranking case, self-preferential treatment has become the focus of antitrust enforcement in various countries. Since the Google search ranking case, the focus of national antitrust enforcement has been on self-preferencing, which covers a wide range of types and has unclear regulatory boundaries.

The EU's ground-breaking gatekeeper rules in the Digital Markets Act (DMA) remove the need for relevant market determinations and market dominance determinations, simplifying the complex economic analysis process and making mega-platforms based on turnover, number of users and market position criteria "gatekeepers" that must comply with a range of obligations such as prohibiting self-preferencing and maintaining data interoperability or face fines.The DMA gives the European Commission greater discretion in regulating self-preferential treatment, making it easier and more efficient to regulate self-preferential behaviour on platforms, but its ex ante approach to regulation has also been widely debated. The main issues are that the theoretical basis for requiring platforms to prohibit self-preferencing through ex ante regulation is not sufficient, that requiring platforms to maintain neutrality in the context of hybrid business models may not promote market competition, and that introducing an ex ante prohibition on self-preferencing may risk overriding existing competition law.

In view of the above problems, this paper argues that: firstly, there is no need to introduce the gatekeeper rule directly in China for the time being; for those acts that cannot be regulated through tying, refusal to deal and differential treatment, self-preferential behaviour can be regulated through the "digital clause" in the new Anti-Monopoly Law, combined with soft law such as standards and guidelines, so as to avoid the direct introduction of the "digital clause". The problem of conflicting laws may arise. The EU is also refining its approach to self-favouritism through enforcement acts and consultation with interested companies, which is not entirely structural in nature. Secondly, if self-preferential behaviour is to be regulated ex ante, then the concept of self-preferencing should be interpreted narrowly. While general self-favouritism as set out in Article 6(5) of the Digital Markets Act has a reasonable basis as it relates to the principle of search neutrality, self-favouritism in relation to data use requires caution; furthermore, penalties should be moderate to avoid strong regulation discouraging platform innovation. In terms of penalties, the EU's gatekeeper rules have the advantage of careful use of structural unbundling and the principle of ne bis in idem. Market-responsive measures could be adopted to achieve a multi-pronged approach to ex ante and ex post regulation. When providing compliance guidelines to platforms, reasonable expectations should be provided to businesses, stakeholders can be introduced to improve the rules if necessary, and the rules set by platforms should be transparent or, although not transparent, not restrict the free choice of operators within the platform.