本文的目的是考察形而上学领域的奠基关系应用于心灵哲学领域，能否为物理主义的现象概念策略带来新的辩护。文中具体将以奠基物理主义能否弥合解释鸿沟来分析奠基关系为物理主义进行辩护的潜力，同时也将从奠基物理主义自身的元奠基问题，和是否能解决排他性问题两个方面来检验奠基关系应用于心灵哲学问题的自洽程度。

在引言中，本文回顾了克里普克的模态论证、查尔莫斯的可设想性论证、杰克逊的知识论证和列文的解释鸿沟，总结了反物理主义者提出的诘难，以及物理主义者针对这些反驳所提出的现象概念策略，其中包括本体论策略、认识论策略和方法论策略。而奠基物理主义，则能够在这三种策略之外找到一条新的针对反物理主义者的现象概念策略，即利用奠基关系赋予意识心灵本体论上的清白(ontological innocence)。

在第一章中，本文将展开讨论奠基关系如何应用于物理主义的研究。在奠基物理主义出现之前，物理主义对于心物关系之间的理解主要有同一关系、因果关系和随附关系，相比其前三种关系，奠基关系则首先支持意识的不可还原性，从根本上否定同一；其次，奠基和随附都属于不同于因果关系的模态关系，用新的方式定义了决定性关系；最后，奠基关系与随附关系相比，属于更强的模态关系，原因在于奠基关系可以在两个关系项之间直接建立联系而随附性却需要诉诸中介。本文认为奠基关系弥合解释鸿沟的关键在于从“何物存在”到“何物是基础”的转向。传统心灵哲学中形而上学的图景往往是定义“心灵是什么”“意识能否独立存在”而奠基物理主义的形而上学关注的是“意识的基础是什么”“拥有心理与物理的世界结构是什么”在这一思路转变下，奠基物理主义能够为弥合解释鸿沟提供新的物理主义策略。

在第二章中，本文以金在权针对非还原物理主义所提出的排他性问题检验奠基物理主义作为一种非还原的物理主义的自洽程度。文中将首先考察金在权提出的排他性论证与过决定问题，并分析以随附论为代表的非还原物理主义如何应对这一问题，以及存在哪些不足之处。在第三章中，本文将通过奠基理论首先补充完善随附论所提供的辩护的不足之处，并且根据奠基理论的特性提出另外一种针对过决定问题的解决思路。

最后，本文的结论是，奠基物理主义为弥合解释鸿沟提供了一种新的概念策略，这种策略以“何物是基础”的眼光重新审视了物理主义的讨论，并为意识与物理世界之间的关系提供了新的界定方式，并且在这种方式下，很多反物理主义，以及反非还原论的质疑都能得以解决。奠基关系对于物理主义，以及神经科学的研究都蕴含着巨大的启发潜力。

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the grounding relationship in the field of metaphysics applied to the field of philosophy of mind can bring a new defense to the phenomenal conceptual strategy of physicalism. Specifically, this paper will analyze the potential of grounding to defend physicalism based on whether grounding physicalism can bridge the explanatory gap, and also test the self-consistency of grounding physicalism applied to philosophy of mind from two aspects: the meta-ground problem and whether it can solve the exclusion problem.

In the introduction, this paper reviews Kripke's modal argument, Chalmers' conceivability argument, Jackson's intellectual argument, and Levin's explanatory gap, summarizing the anti-physicalists' criticisms and the phenomenal conceptual strategies physicists have proposed in response to these rebuttals, including ontological, epistemological, and methodological strategies. Grounding physicalism, on the other hand, can find a new conceptual strategy for anti-physicalists in addition to these three strategies, that is, using grounding relations to grant consciousness and mind ontologically innocent.

In the first chapter,this paper will discuss how grounding theory is applied to the study of physicalism. Before the emergence of grounding physicalism, physicalists' understanding of the relationship between mind and matter mainly had the identity  relationship, causal relationship and supervening relationship, compared with the first three relationships, the grounding relationship first supported the irreducibility of consciousness and fundamentally denied the identity theory; Second, both gorunding and supervenience belong to modals that are different from causal relation, defining decisive relations in new ways; Finally, grounding is a stronger modal than supervenience, because grounding can directly establish a connection between the two relationship items, while supervenience requires recourse to intermediaries. Therefore, the proposal of grounding has great enlightening significance for analyzing the relationship between mental properties and physical properties.

The reason why grounding theory can be applied to gap the explanatory gap lies in the shift from "what exists" to "what is the foundation". In the past, metaphysical images in the philosophy of mind tended to define "what is the mind" and "whether consciousness can exist independently", while the metaphysics of grounding physicalism was concerned with "what is the basis of consciousness?" "What is the structure of the world with mental and physical properties?" Under this shift in thinking, Schaffer and Dasgupta made principled analyses to bridge the gap based on their own understanding of grounding.

In the second chapter, this paper uses Kim Jae-kwon’s exclusive challenge to non-reductive physicalism to test whether grounding physicalism as a non-reductive physicalism can solve this problem. This article will first examine the exclusive argumentation and overdetermination issues proposed by Kim Jae-kwon, and analyze how non-reductive physicalism represented by the supervenience deals with this issue, and what shortcomings exist. In the third chapter, this paper will supplement and perfect the insufficiency of the defense provided by supervenience theory through the grounding theory, and propose another solution to the overdetermination problem according to the characteristics of grounding theory.

Finally, the paper concludes that grounding physicalism offers a new conceptual strategy for bridging the explanatory gap, one that revisits the physicalist discussion in terms of what is fundamental, and provides an insight into the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. In this way, many anti-physicalist and anti-non-reductionist challenges can be resolved.